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Many social, economic and political activities are conducted by groups or coalitions of individ-
uals. For example, consumption takes place within households or families; production is carried
out by …rms which are large coalitions of owners of di¤erent factors of production; workers
are organized in trade unions or professional associations; public goods are produced within a
complex coalition structure of federal, state, and local jurisdictions; political life is conducted
through political parties and interest groups; and individuals belong to networks of formal and
informal social clubs.
The framework of social environments as introduced in Chwe [4] speci…es what each coalition
can do if and when it forms. It is general enough to integrate the representation of a cooperative
game, an extensive-form game with perfect information, and a normal-form game played in such
a fashion that there are coalitional moves and countermoves. An example is the coalitional
contingent threat situation due to Greenberg [5]. Moreover, this framework allows us to study
economic andsocial activities where the rules of the game are rather amorphous or the procedures
are rarely pinned down (e.g. in sequential bargaining or coalition formation without a rigid
protocol), and for which classical game theory could lead to a solution which relies heavily on
an arbitrarily chosen procedure or rule (see Greenberg [5], Greenberg et al. [6]). For social
environments where coalitions can form through binding or non-binding agreements and actions
are public, Chwe [4] and Xue [12] have proposed the solution concepts of the largest consistent
set and the optimistic or conservative stable standards of behavior, respectively. The solution
concepts predict which coalitions structures are possibly stable and could emerge.1
Both approaches have a number of nice features. Firstly, they do not rely on a very detailed
description of the coalition formation process as noncooperative sequential games do, see e.g.
Bloch [3].2 No commitment assumption is imposed. Secondly, it incorporates the farsightedness
of the coalitions. A coalition considers the possibility that, once it acts, another coalition might
react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on without limit. The main di¤erence between
Chwe [4] and Xue [12] is that Xue’s approach strengthens the farsightedness notion. A farsighted
individual considers only the …nal outcomes that might result when making choices. But, an
individual with perfect foresight considers also how …nal outcomes can be reached. That is,
possible deviations along the way to the …nal outcomes should be considered.3
1For a very speci…c social environment, namely the coalitional contingent threat situation, Mariotti [8] has
de…ned an equilibrium concept: the coalitional equilibrium. Central to his concept is the notion of coalitional
strategies and the similarity with subgame perfection (except that coalitions are formally treated as players).
2Sequential coalition formation games are quite sensitive to the exact coalition formation process and rely
on the commitment assumption. Once some individuals have agreed to form a coalition they are committed to
remain in that coalition. They can neither leave the coalition nor propose to change it later on.
3In Chwe [4] the speci…cation of how individuals view and use their alternatives is formalized by the indirect
1Both approaches su¤er from a number of drawbacks as well, some of them pointed out by
the authors themselves. For instance, as indicated in Chwe [4], the largest consistent set may
fail to satisfy the requirement of individual rationality. An individual that is given the choice
between two moves, where one yields with certainty a higher payo¤ than the other, might choose
the move leading to the lower payo¤ according to the largest consistent set. This is perhaps
somewhat less disturbing than it seems at …rst sight, since the largest consistent set aims to be
a weak concept, a concept that rules out with con…dence. It is therefore more surprising, as
we show in this paper, that in certain social environments the largest consistent set may rule
out too much. One drawback of both the optimistic and the conservative stable standards of
behavior of Xue [12], is that both solution sets may be empty. This is worrisome as the idea of
farsightedness suggests that since coalitions do take into account the far reaching consequences
of their moves, they should be able to settle on some stable outcomes at least. We also present
a number of examples where the stable standards of behavior lead to undesirable outcomes, for
instance that both OSSB and even CSSB may rule out too little, or even worse, too much.
We aim for a solution concept that identi…es the consequences of common knowledge of
rationality and farsightedness within the framework of social environments, and that remedies
the problems mentioned above. To achieve this goal, we propose to extend the rationalizability
approach of Bernheim [2] and Pearce [9] to the framework of social environments. Cautiousness
in the rationalizability approach is already introduced in Bernheim [2] and Pearce [9]. Cautious
rationalizability is appropriate if agents are known to be not merely rational but also cautious
(i.e. agents will exercise prudence when it is costless to do so). Cautiousness is needed to
eliminate the taking of risks that seem likely to be costly when there are no o¤setting advantages
for an agent to consider. Here, we use a cautious version of rationalizability that is also analyzed
in Herings and Vannetelbosch [7].
Since social environments deal with the behavior of coalitions, whereas rationalizability is
about the implications of rationality of individuals, we have to convert coalitional behavior into
individual behavior. This is achieved by recognizing that individual participation in a coalition
is basically characterized by two possibilities. An individual may either agree to a coalitional
move, or object to it and block it. Unlike in non-cooperative game theory, in a social environment
several coalitions may and could be willing to move at the same time. Con‡icts of interest may
arise, which can take the form of one coalition trying to preempt the move of another coalition,
but also of coordination problems in and between coalitions. Individuals should therefore also
dominance relation which captures some farsightedness of the individuals. In Xue [12] it is formalized by means
of the theory of social situations developed by Greenberg [5]. A social situation allows to capture perfect foresight
(which strengthens farsightedness) by extending the von Neumann and Morgenstern [11] notion of stability to
accommodate di¤erent behavior on the part of the individuals in terms of their Knightian (pessimism or optimism)
attitude towards uncertainty.
2have beliefs on how such con‡icts of interest are solved.
The equilibrium approach assumes that individuals have common expectations about their
behaviors. That is, each individual holds a correct conjecture about the behavior of every other
individual. But once we admit the possibility that an individual may have several behaviors
that she could reasonably take, conjectures and behaviors actually played may be mismatched.
This is what distinguishes the rationalizability approach from the equilibrium one. Indeed,
in the rationalizability approach, the conjectures are not assumed to be correct, but are only
constrained by considerations of rationality. Each individual believes that the behavior taken
by every other individual is a best response to some conjecture on every other individual’s
behavior, and, further, each individual assumes that every other individual reasons in this way
and hence thinks that every other individual believes that every other individual’s behavior is
a best response to some conjecture, and so on. In other words, the individual rationality of the
individuals is common knowledge.
We introduce two alternative de…nitions of the social rationalizability concept which we show
to be equivalent de…nitions. The …rst one is strongly in‡uenced by Battigalli’s [1] extensive-
form rationalizability. It is based on two assumptions: (1) the individuals are rational and
endowed with a hierarchy of hypotheses, and (2) this is common knowledge at the original
status-quo. Central to our new concept are the notions of individual behavior and of prior-belief.
An individual behavior describes, for each history, the coalitional moves the individual agrees
to join and those she decides to block. Beliefs about which agreement is realized within the set
of agreements are derived from a prior-belief over the entire set of feasible moves. Our second
de…nition is motivated by Pearce’s [9] original extensive-form rationalizability and is based on a
reduction procedure.4 We show the equivalence of our two de…nitions of social rationalizability.
Our main results are the following. We show how the main ideas of rationalizability can be
extended to deal with social environments, which is not straightforward since social environments
are outside the realm of non-cooperative games. By doing so, we are the …rst to provide a
solution concept for social environments that leads to a non-empty set of stable outcomes that
is consistent with individual rationality. Since social environments deal with coalitional moves,
it is important that social rationalizability not only guarantees individual rationality, but also
coalitional rationality. Among a set of Pareto ranked alternatives a coalition should be able
to coordinate on the Pareto optimal one. Social rationalizability is shown to satisfy coalitional
rationality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and primitives.
We present the solution concepts of Chwe [4] and Xue [12], and we give the motivation for
4Other papers related to extensive-form rationalizability (EFR) are among others Bernheim [2], who introduced
subgame-perfect rationalizability, and Shimoji and Watson [10], who studied the equivalence between conditional
dominance and EFR.
3introducing a new concept by means of a number of examples. In Section 3 we propose two
alternative de…nitions of social rationalizability and we show the equivalence of both of them.
The examples are reconsidered and solved by our concept. In Section 4 we study the property
of coalitional rationality and show it is satis…ed by social rationalizability. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2 Social Environments
2.1 Notations and Primitives





where I = f1;2;:::;#Ig is the set of individuals, Z is the …nite set of outcomes, f!SgSµI;S6=;
are e¤ectiveness relations de…ned on Z, and for every individual i 2 I, ui : Z ! R is her utility
function. We denote by #I the cardinality of I. The relation !S represents what coalition S
can do: x0 !S x1 means that if x0 is the status-quo, coalition S can make x1 the new status-quo.
It does not mean that coalition S can enforce x1 no matter what anyone else does; after S moves
to x1 from x0, another coalition S
0
might move to x2, where x1 !S
0 x2. A priori no restrictions
are imposed on the e¤ectiveness relations f!SgSµI;S6=;. For example, the e¤ectiveness relation
can be empty, x0 !S x0 might be possible, and x0 !S x1 does not imply x1 !S x0. All actions
or moves are public and the individuals care only about the end outcome, not how it is reached.
Conventional game theoretic situations can be modeled as a social environment (see for instance
Chwe [4]).
For social environments where coalitions can form through binding or non-binding agree-
ments and actions are public, Chwe [4] and Xue [12] have proposed interesting concepts, the
largest consistent set and the optimistic or conservative stable standards of behavior, respec-
tively, to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable or could emerge.
2.2 The Largest Consistent Set
Based on the indirect dominance relation, Chwe [4] de…ned the largest consistent set (LCS).
The indirect dominance relation captures the fact that farsighted coalitions consider the end
outcome that their move(s) eventually may lead to. Moreover, a coalition may deviate from
a status quo only if each of its members can be made strictly better o¤. So, an outcome y
indirectly dominates x if y can replace x in a sequence of moves, such that at each move all
deviators are better o¤ at the end outcome y compared to the status-quo they face. Formally,
indirect dominance is de…ned as follows.
An outcome x is indirectly dominated by y, or x ¿ y, if there exists a sequence x0;x1;:::;xm;
where x0 = x and xm = y, and a sequence S0;S1;:::;Sm¡1 such that xj !Sj xj+1 and ui(xj) <
4ui(y) 8 i 2 Sj, for j = 0;1;::;m ¡ 1. Direct strict dominance is obtained by setting m = 1. An
outcome x is directly dominated by y, or x < y, if there exists a coalition S such that x !S y
and ui (x) < ui(y) 8 i 2 S. Obviously, if x < y, then x ¿ y. The largest consistent set, LCS (¡),
is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 1 (Chwe, 1994) A set Y µ Z is consistent if x 2 Y if and only if 8 y;S such that
x !S y, 9 z 2 Y , where y = z or y ¿ z, such that we do not have ui (x) < ui (z) for all i 2 S.
The largest consistent set LCS (¡) is the consistent set such that if Y µ Z is consistent then
Y µ LCS (¡).
By considering indirect dominance, the largest consistent set captures the notion of farsight-
edness. An outcome is stable, that is an outcome is in the largest consistent set, if and only if
deviations from it do not occur because the deviation itself or potential further deviations are
not unanimously preferred to the original outcome by the coalition considering the deviation.
Although there can be many consistent sets, Chwe [4] has shown that there uniquely exists a
largest consistent set, LCS (¡); and that the largest consistent set is non-empty. One simple
way to …nd LCS (¡) is to apply the following iterative procedure. Let Y 0 ´ Z. Then, Y k
(k = 1;2;:::) is inductively obtained as follows: x 2 Z belongs to Y k if and only if 8 y;S such
that x !S y, 9 z 2 Y k¡1, where y = z or y ¿ z; such that we do not have ui(x) < ui (z) for all
i 2 S. Then, LCS (¡) is
T
k¸1Y k.
2.3 Stable Standards of Behavior
We give the de…nitions of Optimistic Stable Standard of Behavior (OSSB) and Conservative
Stable Standard of Behavior (CSSB) due to Xue [12]. Some notations and de…nitions have to
be introduced. A path is a sequence (x0;x1;:::;xm) where for all j = 0;1;:::;m ¡1, there exists
a coalition Sj µ I such that xj !Sj xj+1 and xj;xj+1 2 Z. Let ¦ be the set of paths in Z,
and ¦x the set of paths in Z originating from x. Xue [12] de…ned a standard of behavior as a
function ¾ : Z ! 2¦ such that ¾(x) µ ¦x for all x 2 Z. A standard of behavior ¾ is said to be
internally stable if for all outcomes x 2 Z and for all ® 2 ¾(x), there do not exist y 2 ®, S µ I,
and z 2 Z such that y !S z and S “prefers” ¾(z) to ®. A standard of behavior ¾ is said to be
externally stable if for all outcomes x 2 Z and for all ® 2 ¦x n ¾(x), there exist y 2 ®, S µ I
and z 2 Z such that y !S z and S “prefers” ¾(z) to ®. A standard of behavior ¾ is stable if it
is both internally and externally stable.
As in Greenberg [5], Xue [12] distinguished an optimistic and a conservative approach to
de…ne “prefers.” In the optimistic approach a coalition S prefers ¾(z) to ® if 9¯ 2 ¾(z);
ui(®) < ui(¯) 8i 2 S.5 In the conservative approach a coalition S prefers ¾(z) to ® if 8¯ 2 ¾(z);
5We de…ne the utility of a path ® as the utility of the end outcome of ®.
5ui(®) < ui(¯) 8i 2 S. An OSSB is a stable standard of behavior, where “prefers” is de…ned by
the optimistic approach. A CSSB is a stable standard of behavior, where “prefers” is de…ned
by the conservative approach. Formally,
De…nition 2 (Xue, 1998) Let ¾ be a standard of behavior. Then,
(i) ¾ is an OSSB if 8x 2 Z, ® 2 ¦xn¾(x) () 9S µ I, y 2 ®, and z 2 Z such that y !S z and
9¯ 2 ¾(z) : ui(®) < ui(¯) 8i 2 S.
(ii) ¾ is a CSSB if 8x 2 Z, ® 2 ¦xn¾(x) () 9S µ I, y 2 ®, and z 2 Z such that y !S z and
8¯ 2 ¾(z) 6= ; : ui(®) < ui(¯) 8i 2 S:
2.4 Motivation and Examples
As has already been mentioned by Chwe [4] himself, the LCS is blurring or avoiding important
issues, and hence, su¤ers substantial drawbacks. One drawback is that the LCS does not in-
corporate any idea of best response. Thereby, it is not very surprising that the LCS does not









Figure 1: Individual rationality.
that is currently at the status quo x0 where she gets 1 unit of utility. She has the possibility
to move to outcome x1 and obtain 2 units of utility, or to go to outcome x2 and receive 3 units
of utility. In the social environment of Figure 1, LCS(¡) = fx1;x2g: This is unreasonable as
a simple optimization dictates individual 1 to move to x2; in order to get a utility equal to 3
instead of 2. So, the LCS does not satisfy individual rationality.6
6Two other problems have also been mentioned by Chwe [4]. First, the LCS does not incorporate the decision
of subcoalitions to veto coalitional moves. Second, a coalition considers what further moves other coalitions will
make once it moves, but does not consider what other coalitions will do if it does not move. Hence, the LCS does
not allow for the possibility of coalitions moving to preempt the moves of other coalitions. Social rationalizability
(as well as Xue’s [12] concepts) overcomes these problems.
6It is more surprising that we have found social environments where LCS rules out too much.
This problem is more serious as LCS is developed to be a weak concept that rules out with
con…dence. In the social environment of Figure 2, there are three individuals that have the
- - - u u u u
x0 (1;1;0) x1 (2;0;0) x2 (0;0;0) x3 (0;1;0)
f1g f2g f3g
Figure 2: LCS may rule out too much
opportunity to move in a sequential manner. The status quo is x0: The utility tuples achievable
at the four outcomes are indicated in parentheses, with the utility of individual i in position i:
The direct dominance relation is given by x0 < x1 and the indirect one by x0 ¿ x1: It follows
that LCS(¡) = fx1;x2;x3g; so outcome x0 is ruled out. However, individual 1 only wants to
move from outcome x0 to outcome x1 if she is sure that individual 2 will not move from x1 to
x2: Individual 2 does have incentives to move from x1 to x2 as the move to x2 enables individual
3 to move to x3: It is only when individual 2 is sure that 3 does not move that he is indi¤erent
between moving and not moving. Even under such extreme beliefs individual 2 would not loose
from moving to x2: It is therefore certainly reasonable for individual 1 not to move from outcome
x0 to x1: A concept that aims to rule out with con…dence should not rule out outcome x0.
The OSSB seems to perform better than LCS for the social environment of Figure 2. It
holds that the unique OSSB is de…ned by ¾(x0) = f(x0)g; ¾(x1) = f(x1;x2;x3)g; ¾(x2) =
f(x2);(x2;x3)g and ¾(x3) = f(x3)g. The uniqueness of OSSB follows from Claim 3.11 in Xue
[12]. So individual 1 will not make the move from x0 to x1; because she fears the move of
individual 2 from x1 to x2. Less convincing is that (x1;x2) = 2 ¾(x1). Individual 2 hopes for the
best, so he is convinced that individual 3 moves from x2 to x3. This is not consistent with the
fact that ¾(x2) contains both (x2) and (x2;x3).
The CSSB is a truly weak concept. It doesn’t rule out anything in the social environment
of Figure 2. But even though a CSSB is typically a very weak concept, it may also rule out
too much. In the social environment of Figure 3 there is a unique CSSB, given by ¾(x0) = ;;
¾(x1) = f(x1)g and ¾(x2) = f(x2)g. The uniqueness of CSSB follows from Claim 3.11 in Xue
[12]. Although a unique CSSB exists, it is empty-valued for some status quos. A standard of









Figure 3: CSSB and OSSB may rule out too much.
assigns the obvious ¾(x1) = f(x1)g and ¾(x2) = f(x2)g; since (x0;x2) 2 ¾(x0); x0 !f1g x1; and
¾(x1) is preferred to (x0;x2):
The unique OSSB coincides with the CSSB for the social environment of Figure 3, and may
therefore also be empty-valued and rule out too much, a feature that is less surprising for OSSB.
The example becomes even more striking when we add a move x0 !f1;2g x3 with payo¤s ¡1
for both individuals. Then the unique CSSB and the unique OSSB are given by ¾(x0) = ;;
¾(x1) = f(x1)g; ¾(x2) = f(x2)g and ¾(x3) = f(x3)g: The solution concepts CSSB and OSSB
do not distinguish the moves to x1 and x2 on the one hand, and the move to x3 on the other.
Another possibility is to add a move x3 !f1g x0 and to put the utility of both individuals to ¡1
at x3. The standard of behavior ¾(x3) = f(x3)g; ¾(x0) = ;; ¾(x1) = f(x1)g; and ¾(x2) = f(x2)g
is both an OSSB and a CSSB. The worst outcome is stable.
CSSB and OSSB may also rule out too little. In the social environment of Figure 4, the









Figure 4: OSSB and CSSB may rule out too little.
¾(x0) = f(x0);(x0;x1);(x0;x2)g; ¾(x1) = f(x1)g and ¾(x2) = f(x2)g is both the unique CSSB
and the unique OSSB. It may look like this phenomenon is caused by the absence of the no-move.
8But even if we add moves x0 !f1g x0; x0 !f2g x0; x0 !f1;2g x0, then the standard of behav-
ior de…ned by ¾(x0) = f(x0);(x0;x1);(x0;x2);(x0;x0);(x0;x0;x1);(x0;x0;x2); (x0;x0;x0);¢¢¢g;
¾(x1) = f(x1)g and ¾(x2) = f(x2)g is a CSSB. OSSB seems to do better now, as the unique
OSSB is given by ¾(x0) = f(x0);(x0;x0);(x0;x0;x0);¢¢¢g; ¾(x1) = f(x1)g; and ¾(x2) = f(x2)g.
In order to remedy these drawbacks, we propose a notion of rationalizability for social en-
vironments, which identi…es the coalitions that are likely to form and the outcomes that might
occur when (1) the individuals are rational and endowed with a hierarchy of hypotheses, and
(2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo.
3 Rationalizable Social Behaviors
3.1 Individual and Social Behaviors
In what follows, we denote the move of coalition S from x to y, x !S y, by (xy;S). The
no-move at status-quo x is denoted by (xx;;). One has to distinguish between (xx;;) and
(xx;fig). Indeed, (xx;fig) means that individual i can move from x to x. The set of all
possible moves and no-move is given by M = f(xy;S)jx;y 2 Z;x !S yg[f(xx;;)jx 2 Zg: An
original status-quo is given, and it is denoted x0. We consider histories starting at x0. We




j) 2 M, m¡
1 = x0, m+
j = m¡
j+1 and mc
j denotes the coalition of individuals that
moves from m¡
j to m+
j , j = 1;:::;k ¡1. The length of a history h is denoted l(h) with l(h) = 1
for h = (x0). To make the length of a history h explicit, we sometimes denote it by hk, where
k is the length of the history. Let h¡ = x0 be the original status-quo of h and h+ = m+
l(h)¡1 be
the end outcome of h. Given hk and j · k (j;k 2 N), we call hj a sub-history of hk if hj consists
of the …rst j elements of hk, and we write hj · hk. A history is di¤erent from a path as used in
the theory of stable standards of behavior. A path only gives a sequence of outcomes, whereas
for a history it also matters which coalition made the move from one outcome to another.
The set of feasible moves after history h is denoted by M (h) = fm 2 Mjh+ = m¡gnf(h+h+;
;)g for all h. It does not include the no-move. Let Mi(h) = f(xy;S) 2 M (h)ji 2 Sg be the set
of feasible moves after history h involving individual i. The set of individuals that has a move
after history h is denoted I (h) = fi 2 IjMi (h) 6= ;g.
We denote by H the set of all histories with …nite length and by H(J) the set of histories
with at most J moves. That is, H (J) = fh 2 Hjl(h) · J + 1g. Temporarily we …x J and
consider only histories in H(J). Let Hi(J) = fh 2 H (J)jMi (h) 6= ;g. It is the set of histories
that contain at most J moves and after which individual i is involved in a move. Individual i’s
opponents are denoted by ¡i. As general notation, we denote by ¢(X) the set of all probability
measures on X. For …nite X, we denote by ¢0(X) the set of all probability measures giving
9positive probability to each member of X.
A social behavior selects after any history a unique move or a no-move. We denote it by
b = (b(h))h2H(J) where b(h) 2 M(h) [ f(h+h+;;)g. Let B be the set of all social behaviors.
Our aim is to …nd those social behaviors that are rationalizable. From the rationalizable social
behaviors, we derive the set of outcomes that are stable. We aim for a concept that is weak, so
rules out with con…dence. To do this, we examine individual behaviors …rst.
We model an individual behavior as, for each history, the set of coalitional moves the in-
dividual agrees to join and those she decides to block. Observe that the framework of social
environments does not exclude that an individual might agree to join more than one coali-
tional move (if possible). Formally, a behavior of individual i is bi = (bi(¢ j h))h2Hi(J) where
bi(¢ j h) : Mi (h) ! f0;1g. If bi((xy;S) j h) = 1 then i 2 S agrees to join in the potential move
of coalition S from x to y. If bi((xy;S) j h) = 0 then i 2 S blocks the move of coalition S from
x to y. The set of all possible behaviors of individual i is denoted by Bi.




¯; 6= M ½ M (h)
ª
the collection of sets of feasible moves after h. For every history h 2
H (J), the agreement function is a mapping f(¢ j h) :
Q
i2I Bi ! M(h) [ f(h+h+;;)g which
associates to the pro…les of individual behaviors the set of moves after history h on which there
is agreement, so
(i) f((bi)i2I j h) = M 2 M(h) if 8(xy;S) 2 M, 8i 2 S, we have bi((xy;S) j h) = 1 and
8(xy;S) 2 M(h) n M, 9i 2 S such that bi((xy;S) j h) = 0;
(ii) f((bi)i2I j h) = (h+h+;;) if 8(xy;S) 2 M (h), 9i 2 S such that bi((xy;S) j h) = 0.
A pro…le of individual behaviors induces a social behavior or a number of social behaviors.
A social behavior is induced by a pro…le of individual behaviors if for each history the move
prescribed by the social behavior is a move on which there is agreement by all individuals
involved in the move, or the no-move when no agreement is possible.
3.2 Beliefs, Conjectures and Payo¤s
A problem arises when there are several moves on which agreement is possible. One alternative
is to assume that all individuals have uniform prior-beliefs on the set M(h): The likelihood
of a particular move in the set of moves on which there is agreement, is then determined
by Bayesian updating. This results in uniform ex post beliefs on the agreement set. We al-
low the individuals to have any prior-beliefs on the set M(h): Only, it is assumed that the
10prior-beliefs of the individuals are cautious. Let qi = (qi(¢ j h))h2H(J) be the prior-belief
of individual i, where qi(¢ j h) : M (h) ! ¢0(M(h)). Hence, given a set of agreements
M µ M(h), the probability individual i assigns to the realization of the move m 2 M is
given by qi(m j h;M) = (qi(m j h)) ¢ [
P
m2M qi(m j h)]¡1 if m 2 M and qi(m j h;M) = 0
otherwise. Let Qi be the set of all functions qi.
The basis for rationalizability is that individuals form conjectures about eachothers’ behavior
and then optimize subject to these conjectures. We restrict the individuals to hold uncorrelated
conjectures7 about the behaviors of their opponents. After each history h 2 Hi(J) at which
individual i is involved in a move, she holds such conjectures. A conjecture of individual i is
a mapping ci : Hi(J) !
Q
j6=i ¢(Bj). We denote by ci(h
0
)(b¡i) the probability individual i
conjectures at history h
0




)(bj) 2 ¢(Bj) the
probability individual i conjectures at history h
0
that player j’s behavior is bj. Notice that a
conjecture may change as the course of the social situation unfolds, and that there is only a need
for an individual to form conjectures when an individual is potentially involved in a move.
A conjecture ci reaches h 2 Hi (J) if there is an individual behavior bi, and there are in-
dividual behaviors of her opponents b¡i in the support of ci such that (bi;b¡i) reaches h. A
pro…le (bi;b¡i) reaches h = (x0;m1;:::;mk) if bi(mj j hj) = 1 8i 2 mc
j, j = 1;:::;k. A behavior
bi reaches h if there is b¡i such that (bi;b¡i) reaches h. A set A¡i µ B¡i reaches h if there is
(bi;b¡i) with b¡i 2 A¡i reaching h.
At each history h
0
after which individual i has a move, she uses her prior-beliefs and conjec-
tures at h
0
to determine the likelihood of future moves by means of Bayesian updating. Given
bi 2 Bi, qi 2 Qi, ci : Hi(J) !
Q
j6=i ¢(Bj), and h
0
2 Hi (J), the probability individual i at h
0
believes that history h = (x0;m1;m2;:::;mk) ¸ h0 will be followed by the move mk+1 is denoted
by di(h
0
)(mk+1 j h) with di(h
0
)(¢ j h) 2 ¢(M (h)[ f(h+h+;;)g). Whenever (bi;ci) reaches h;















b¡i [p(b¡i j ci(h
0)) ¢ p(h;(xy;S) j bi;b¡i;qi)]
,




)(b¡i) and p(h;(xy;S) j bi;b¡i;qi) is the prob-
ability that h = (x0;m1;m2;:::;mk) realizes and is followed by mk+1 = (xy;S), given bi, b¡i
and qi. If (xy;S) 2 M(h) then p(h;(xy;S) j bi;b¡i;qi) =
Qk+1
j=1 qi(mj j hj;f(bi;b¡i j hj)).
7The analysis where individuals hold correlated conjectures about the behaviors of their opponents is very
similar.
11If (xy;S) = (h+h+;;) then p(h;(xy;S) j bi;b¡i;qi) =
Qk
j=1qi(mj j hj;f(bi;b¡i j hj)) if
f(bi;b¡i j h) = (h+h+;;), and p(h;(xy;S) j bi;b¡i;qi) = 0 if f(bi;b¡i j h )6= (h+h+;;), which
re‡ects that when there is agreement on some moves, one of them will be realized and the
no-move does not occur.
From the realizations probabilities at h
0
an individual can easily determine the likelihood of
ending up at the di¤erent outcomes from which the expected utility of the individual follows
immediately. Given (bi;ci;qi); where (bi;ci) reaches h0; the expected utility of individual i





















where h¡1(fxg) = fh 2 H (J)jl(h) = J and h+ = x or h = (x0;m1;:::;mk¡1;(xx;;)) with
k < Jg is the set of histories of length at most J ending at x 2 Z.
3.3 Social Rationalizability
We next propose two alternative de…nitions of social rationalizability which we show to be
equivalent. The …rst one is strongly in‡uenced by Battigalli’s [1] extensive-form rationalizability
and is based on the notion of a hierarchy of nested hypotheses. The second one is motivated by
Pearce’s [9] original extensive-form rationalizability and is based on a reduction procedure.8
The concept of social rationalizability based on the approach of Battigalli is based on two
assumptions: (1) the individuals are rational and endowed with a hierarchy of hypotheses, and
(2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo. A rational individual i maximizes her
expected payo¤ at each history h reached by the play, subject to her consistent updating system
of conjectures, ci.
De…nition 3 A consistent updating system for individual i is a mapping ci : Hi(J) !
Q
j6=i¢(Bj),
such that for all g;h 2 Hi(J) :
(i) ci (h) reaches h,
(ii) if g < h and ci(g) reaches h, then ci(g) = ci (h).
The consistency of the updating system requires that the conjecture at history h is consistent
with h being reached and that no conjecture is changed unless falsi…ed. That is, individuals
8Pearce’s [9] extensive-form rationalizability (EFR), like most extensive-form theories, does not adequately
deal with counterfactuals and strategic manipulations of conjectures. Battigalli [1] overcomes such drawbacks by
providing an alternative characterization of EFR which is not a reduction procedure. Only individuals’ updating
systems of conjectures are restricted. Such restrictions are modeled as a hierarchy of nested hypotheses, ruling out
strategic manipulation. This hierarchy corresponds to the sequence of strategy sets given by Pearce’s [9] iterative
deletion procedure.
12update according to Bayes rule whenever possible. An individual behavior bi is individually
rational if it is a best response to some cautious consistent updating system ci and to some
prior-belief qi. In De…nition 4, R1
i is the set of individual behaviors of i that are individually
rational. Higher degrees of rationality are constructed recursively.
De…nition 4 Let R0 =
Q
i2I Bi. For n ¸ 1, Rn =
Q
i2I Rn
i is inductively de…ned as follows:
for all i 2 I, bi 2 Rn
i if there exists qi 2 Qi and a consistent updating system ci such that
(i) for all h
0










(ii) for all h
0
2 Hi (J), if bi reaches h
0











i ;ci;qi), where bi=b bh
0
i is the behavior which results
from bi when behavior at h
0
and its followers g > h
0
is speci…ed by b bi.
The set R1(J) = limn!1 Rn is the set of rationalizable individual behaviors where histories
contain at most J moves.
De…nition 4 can be interpreted as follows. The sequence R1
j, R2
j, R3
j, ... (j 6= i) represents
for individual i a hierarchy of increasingly strong hypotheses about the behavior of individual
j. When individual i adopts a behavior bi 2 R1
i (J), she always holds the strongest hypothesis
which is consistent with the history reached (part (i) in De…nition 4) and optimizes accordingly.
Two important distinctions to extensive form rationalizability are that optimization takes place
against both ci and qi; and that conjectures are cautious.
The concept of social rationalizability based on the ideas in Pearce [9] is a reduction procedure
and is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 5 Let P0 =
Q
i2I Bi. For n ¸ 1, Pn =
Q
i2I Pn
i is inductively de…ned as follows:
for all i 2 I, bi 2 Pn
i if
(i) bi 2 Pn¡1
i ,
(ii) there exists qi 2 Qi and a consistent updating system ci such that for all h
0
2 Hi (J) that
















The set P1 (J) = limn!1 Pn is the set of rationalizable individual behaviors where histories
contain at most J moves.
Theorem 1 claims that the two de…nitions of social rationalizability are equivalent. Through-
out the rest of the paper we focus on social rationalizability à la Pearce.
Theorem 1 For all n ¸ 0;Rn = Pn.
13Proof. Obviously, R0 = P0: We give a proof by induction, so suppose Rn¡1 = Pn¡1: Consider
some bi 2 Rn
i : Since Rn µ Rn¡1 = Pn¡1; it holds that bi 2 Pn¡1
i ; and Condition (i) in
De…nition 5 is satis…ed. Suppose h0 2 Hi(J) is reached by bi and Pn¡1
¡i : By the de…nition of Rn
i ;






j ) and bi is a best response to (ci(h0);qi) at h0; that is, for all b bi 2 Bi ¶ Pn¡1
i ;
Ui(h0)(bi;ci;qi) ¸ Ui(h0)(bi=b bh0
i ;ci;qi): It follows that Conditions (iia) and (iib) in De…nition 5
are satis…ed, so bi 2 Pn
i :
Consider some bi 2 Pn
i : Since Pn µ Pn¡1 = Rn¡1; it holds that bi 2 Rn¡1
i : Since bi 2 Rn¡1
i ;
there exists qi 2 Qi and a consistent updating system ci such that if bi reaches h 2 Hi(J) then
bi is a best response to ci(h) 2
Q
j6=i ¢0(Rk¤
j ) and qi; where k¤ · n ¡ 2: Since bi 2 Pn
i ; there
exists b qi 2 Qi and a consistent updating system b ci such that if bi and Pn¡1
¡i = Rn¡1
¡i reach













Ui(h)(bi;b ci;b qi) ¸ Ui(h)(bi=b bi;b ci;b qi): The use of a cautious b qi and a cautious consistent updating
system b ci implies that b ci(h) = b ci(h0) 2
Q
j6=i ¢0(Rn¡1
j ) for all h;h0 2 Hi(J) reached by Rn¡1
¡i :
We de…ne e ci by
e ci(h) = b ci(h) if h 2 Hi(J) is reached by R
n¡1
i
e ci(h) = ci(h) if h 2 Hi(J) is not reached by Rn¡1
i ;
and e qi by
e qi(¢ j h) = b qi(¢ j h) if h 2 H(J) is reached by Rn¡1
i ;
e qi(¢ j h) = qi(¢ j h) if h 2 H(J) is not reached by Rn¡1
i :
It can be veri…ed that e qi 2 Qi and that e ci is a consistent updating system.
For k¤ the maximal element in f0;1;:::;n ¡ 1g such that Rk¤
¡i reaches h0 2 Hi(J); it holds
that e ci(h0) 2
Q
j6=i ¢0(Rk¤
j ); so e ci satis…es Condition (i) of De…nition 4.
It remains to be shown that for all h0 2 Hi(J); if bi reaches h0; then bi is a best response to
(e ci(h0); e qi) at h0; that is, for all b bi 2 Bi; Ui(h0)(bi;e ci;e qi) ¸ Ui(h0)(bi=b bh0
i ;e ci;e qi): If h0 is not reached
by Rn¡1
i ; then bi is a best response to ci(h0) 2
Q
j6=i ¢0(Rk¤
j ) and qi; where k¤ · n ¡2; and, by
de…nition of e ci;e qi; bi is therefore a best response to (e ci(h0); e qi) at h0: If h0 is reached by Rn¡1
i ;
then for all b bi 2 Pn¡1
i ;
Ui(h0)(bi;b ci;b qi) ¸ Ui(h0)(bi=b bh0
i ;b ci; b qi);
and so, by de…nition of (e ci;e qi);
Ui(h0)(bi;e ci;e qi) ¸ Ui(h0)(bi=b bh0
i ;e ci; e qi):
It remains to be shown that there is no b bi 2 Bi n Pn¡1
i such that
Ui(h0)(bi;e ci;e qi) < Ui(h0)(bi=b bh0
i ;e ci; e qi):
14Since h0 is reachedby bi and Rn¡1
i ; h0 occurs with positive probability. ButthenUi(x0)(bi;e ci; e qi) <
Ui(x0)(bi=b bh0
i ;e ci;e qi): Let
b Bi = fb bi 2 Bi jb bi maximizes Ui(x0)(b bi;e ci; e qi)g:
Notice that b Bi µ BinPn¡1
i : Let k · n¡2 be the smallest integer such that b Bi\Pk
i 6= ;: We will
show that one of the elements of b Bi belongs to Pk+1
i . To do so we need a consistent updating
system ci such that ci(h) belongs to
Q
j6=i ¢0(Pk
j ) for all histories h 2 Hi(J) reached by Pk
¡i
against which some member of b Bi is a best response in Pk
i . Consider a perturbation ci(h0) of
e ci(h0) that belongs to
Q
j6=i ¢0(Pk
j ); choose ci(h) = ci(h0) for all histories h 2 Hi(J) reached by
Pk
¡i and choose ci(h) at other histories such that ci is consistent. The perturbation ci can be
chosen small enough to guarantee that Ui(x0)(b bi;ci;e qi) > Ui(x0)(bi;ci;e qi); for all b bi 2 b Bi; for all
bi 2 Bi n b Bi: Consider an optimal choice in Pk
i against (ci; e qi): Obviously it is an element of b Bi;
but then b Bi \ Pk+1
i 6= ;; contradicting the de…nition of k:
Obviously, from Theorem 1, R1(J) = P1(J). Let S1 (J) denote the set of rationalizable
social behaviors. A social behavior b belongs to S1(J) if there exists (bi)i2I 2 P1(J) such that
b(h) = m 2 M(h) implies bi(m j h) = 1; 8i 2 mc; and b(h) = (h+h+;;) implies f(bi;b¡i j h) = ;:
We denote by Z1
J (x0) the set of rationalizable outcomes withoriginalstatus-quo x0 2 Z. It is
given by Z1
J (x0) = fx 2 Z j 9(x0;m1;:::;mk) 2 h¡1(fxg), 9b 2 S1 (J) such that 8j = 1;:::;k,
b(x0;m1;:::;mj¡1) = mjg. The set of socially rationalizable outcomes, Z1(x0); is obtained
by letting J go to in…nity, Z1 (x0) = limsupJ!1 Z1
J (x0): The set of socially rationalizable
outcomes is never empty.
Theorem 2 Z1 (x0) 6= ;.
Proof. Consider the iterative procedure provided by De…nition 5. For each iteration n, choose a





j ) for all h
0
2 Hi(J)
reached by Pn¡1. Consider any bi 2 P
n¡1
i such that Ui(x0)(bi;ci;qi) ¸ Ui(x0)(b bi;ci;qi) for all
b bi 2 Pn¡1
i . If h
0
is reached by bi and Pn¡1







i ;ci;qi) for all b bi 2 Pn¡1
i . It follows that bi 2 Pn
i , so Pn 6= ;.




¸ N. It follows
that P1(J) = PN 6= ;. Any (bi)i2I 2 P1(J) yields a social behavior b 2 S1(J), so S1(J) 6= ;;
and as a consequence Z1
J (x0) 6= ;. As a subset of the …nite set Z it holds that Z1
J (x0) is …nite.
Now it follows from the de…nition of the limit superior that Z1(x0) 6= ;.
We reconsider the four examples and we show that social rationalizability remedies the prob-
lems of the largest consistent set, the optimistic stable standard of behavior, and the conservative
15stable standard of behavior. Even though the de…nitions so far may seem rather complicated,
the examples are easily solved for by the reduction procedure of De…nition 5.
Example 1: Consider again the social environment where I = f1g, Z = fx0;x1;x2g, and
the e¤ectiveness relations as well as the payo¤s are depicted in Figure 1. We have H1(J) =
f(x0)g and M1(x0) = f(x0x1;f1g);(x0x2;f1g)g. Any behavior of individual 1 is such that
b1((x0x1;f1g) j (x0)) = 1 or 0 and b1((x0x2;f1g) j (x0)) = 1 or 0. For simplicity, we denote the
set of all behaviors of individual 1 as B1 = f(0;0);(0;1);(1;0);(1;1)g where (0;1) means that
b1((x0x1;f1g) j (x0)) = 0 and b1((x0x2;f1g) j (x0)) = 1. By De…nition 5, P0 = B1. Obviously,
the unique best response for individual 1 is her behavior (0;1). Hence, this social environment
has a unique rationalizable social behavior b(x0) = (x0x2;f1g) and a unique rationalizable out-
come Z1(x0) = fx2g. So, contrary to the largest consistent set, social rationalizability satis…es
individual rationality.
Example 2: Consider again the social environment where I = f1;2;3g, Z = fx0;x1;x2;x3g,
and the e¤ectiveness relations as well as the payo¤s are depicted in Figure 2. Let h1 = (x0),
h2 = (x0;(x0x1;f1g)) and h3 = (x0;(x0x1;f1g);(x1x2;f2g)). We have Hi(J) = fhig and
Mi(hi) = f(xi¡1xi;fig)g, i = 1;2;3. Any behavior of individual i is such that bi((xi¡1xi;fig) j
hi) = 1 or 0. The set of all behaviors of individual i is Bi = f0;1g, i 2 I. By De…nition 5,
P0 = B1 £B2 £B3. When individual 3 gets the move, she is really indi¤erent between moving
and not moving, so P1
3 = B3. When individual 2 contemplates the move from x1 to x2, he conjec-
tures a positive probability to individual 3 moving to x3. Indeed, any c2(h2) 2 ¢0(B1)£¢0(B3)
puts positive probability weight on both b3((x2x3;f3g) j h3) = 1 and b3((x2x3;f3g) j h3) = 0.
Hence, the unique optimal behavior for individual 2 is b2((x1x2;f2g) j h2) = 1, and P1
2 is a
proper subset of B2: P1
2 = f1g. Initially, individual 1 puts positive probability weight on all
behaviors of 2 and 3, and depending on her conjectures she decides to stay at x0 or to move
to x1, so P1
1 = B1. However, in the second iteration she knows that individual 2 will move
to x2 for sure when given the move: any c1(h1) 2 ¢0(P1
2) £ ¢0(P1
3) gives probability one to
b2((x1x2;f2g) j h2) = 1. Therefore, the unique optimal behavior for individual 1 is to stay at x0:
b1((x0x1;f1g) j h1) = 0. So, P1
1 = f0g, P1
2 = f1g and P1
3 = B3. The unique rationalizable
(or stable) outcome is the original status-quo, Z1(x0) = fx0g:
Example 3: Consider again the social environment where I = f1;2g, Z = fx0;x1;x2g, and
the e¤ectiveness relations as well as the payo¤s are depicted in Figure 3. Let h1 = (x0). We
have Hi(J) = fh1g and Mi(h1) = f(x0xi;fig)g, i 2 I. Any behavior of individual i is such that
bi((x0xi;fig) j h1) = 1 or 0. The set of all behaviors of individual i is Bi = f0;1g, i 2 I. By
16De…nition 5, P0 = B1 £ B2. Given any qi 2 Qi and any ci(h1) 2 ¢0(B¡i), individual i has a
unique best response which is to move to xi. So, bi((x0xi;fig) j h1) = 1, P1
i = P1
i = f1g, i 2 I,
and Z1(x0) = fx1;x2g.
Example 4: Consider again the social environment where I = f1;2g, Z = fx0;x1;x2g, and
the e¤ectiveness relations as well as the payo¤s are depicted in Figure 4. Let h1 = (x0). We
have Hi(J) = fh1g and Mi(h1) = f(x0xi;fig)g, i 2 I. Any behavior of individual i is such that
bi((x0xi;fig) j h1) = 1 or 0. The set of all behaviors of individual i is Bi = f0;1g, i 2 I. By
De…nition 5, P0 = B1 £ B2. Given any qi 2 Qi and any ci(h1) 2 ¢0(B¡i), individual i has a
unique best response which is not to move. So, bi((x0xi;fig) j h1) = 0, P1
i = P1
i = f0g, i 2 I,
and Z1(x0) = fx0g.
4 Coalitional Rationality
Social rationalizability is based on common knowledge of individual rationality. An interesting
theory of social behavior should also be expected to satisfy at least some rudimentary forms of
coalitional rationality. It is conceivable that coalitions fail to choose between a set of outcomes,
because of internal disputes on the outcome on which to coordinate. If, on the other hand, the
outcomes are Pareto ranked, then a sensible concept of coalitional rationality should prescribe
coordination on the outcome that Pareto dominates all the others. We can formalize this within
the theory of social environments.
Consider the social environment ¡¤ where I = f1;2;:::;#Ig, Z = fx0;x1;:::;xNg, the out-
comes are Pareto ranked: ui(xN) > ui(xN¡1) > ::: > ui(x1) > ui(x0) = 0 8i 2 I, and only
x0 !I xk, k = 1;:::;N; are possible moves. A two-individual case with N = 3 is depicted
in Figure 5. We say that social rationalizability satis…es coalitional rationality if it selects the
Pareto-dominant outcome, xN.
In this social environment ¡¤, we have I(x0) = I, Hi = f(x0)g and M(x0) = Mi(x0) =
f(x0x1;I);(x0x2;I);:::;(x0xN;I)g; 8i 2 I. A behavior of individual i is denoted by bi =
(bi1;:::;bik;:::;biN) where bik = bi((x0xk;I) j (x0)); so, bik is component k of bi. A belief of
individual i over the realization of agreements is denoted by qi = (qi1;:::;qik;:::;qiN) where qik
is the probability assigned by the prior-belief of individual i to the move (x0xk;I). From now
on we denote the history (x0) by h1.
Example 5: Consider the two-individual and three-move case, I = f1;2g, Z = fx0;x1;x2;x3g,
x0 !I xk, k = 1;2;3, are the only possible moves, and the special case where ui(xk) = k;
8k 2 f0;1;2;3g; 8i 2 f1;2g. This social environment is depicted in Figure 5. The behaviors of
17individual i are such that bi((x0xk;f1;2g) j h1) = 1 or bi((x0xk;f1;2g) j h1) = 0, k = 1;2;3. The
set of all behaviors of individual i is Bi = f(0;0;0), (1;0;0), (0;1;0), (0;0;1), (1;1;0), (1;0;1),
(0;1;1), (1;1;1)g, where (1;0;1) simply means bi((x0x1;f1;2g) j h1) = 1, bi((x0x2;f1;2g) j
h1) = 0, bi((x0x3;f1;2g) j h1) = 1 for individual i, i = 1;2. Which outcomes are socially









Figure 5: Coalitional rationality.
By De…nition 5, P0
i = Bi. We show …rst that (0;0;0), (1;0;0), (0;1;0), (1;1;0) do not
belong to P1
i , i = 1;2. Take any bi 2 Bi such that bi3 = 0 and take b
0





i2 = bi2 and b
0
i3 = 1. It is quite straightforward that, for all ci(h1) 2 ¢0(Bj) and for all qi 2 Qi,
Ui(h1)(bi;ci;qi) < Ui(h1)(b
0
i;ci;qi). Indeed, the behaviors bi and b
0
i give the same payo¤s to
individual i against the opponent’s behaviors bj with bj3 = 0, but b
0
i does strictly better than bi
against the opponent’s behaviors with bj3 = 1.
Next it is shown that all bi 2 Bi with bi3 = 1 belong to P1
i , i = 1;2. For any bi with bi3 = 1,
there exists ci(h1) 2 ¢(Bj) and qi 2 Qi such that bi is the unique best response among Bi. For












7 if bj = (1;0;0) or bj = (0;0;1)
1
7 if bj = (1;1;1)
0 otherwise
.
In Table 1 we give beliefs and conjectures against which each behavior bi with bi3 = 1 is the
unique best response. By a continuity argument, see also Lemma 3 below, bi is also the unique
best response against the belief qi and a cautious conjecture that puts weight on all behaviors
bj 2 Bj. So, P1
i = f(0;0;1), (1;0;1), (0;1;1), (1;1;1)g, i = 1;2.
In the second iteration, individual i knows that individual j will play a behavior in P1
j .
Hence, for all ci(h1) 2 ¢0(P1
j ) and for all qi 2 Qi, the unique best response of individual i is
18bi
bj (0;0;1) (1;0;1) (0;1;1) (1;1;1)
















(1;1;0) 0 0 0 0
(0;1;1) 0 0 0 0


































Table 1: Unique best response, conjecture and belief.
the behavior bi = (0;0;1) which gives her a payo¤ of 3. Indeed, for all ci(h1) 2 ¢0(P1
j ) and for
all qi 2 Qi, any b
0
i 6= bi belonging to P1
i will give her a payo¤ less than 3, because ci(h1) puts




i and qi has full support. So, P2
i = f(0;0;1)g = P1
i , i = 1;2, and
Z1(x0) = fx3g. In Example 5, the case with two individuals and three Pareto ranked moves, the
property of coalitional rationality is satis…ed. There is a unique socially rationalizable outcome
and it is the Pareto-dominant one.
We show that the coalitional rationality property holds in general in the social environment
¡¤. In order to do so we use the following …ve lemmas. Lemma 3 tells us that if a behavior
of individual i is the unique best response against a conjecture ci (possibly degenerate) and a
belief qi, then it is also the unique best response against some cautious conjecture c¤
i and the
belief qi.
Lemma 3 Take any bi 2 Bi. If there exists qi 2 Qi and ci such that (i) ci(h1) 2
Q
j6=i ¢(Bj)
and (ii) for all b
0
i 2 Bi, b
0
i 6= bi, Ui(h1)(bi;ci;qi) > Ui(h1)(b
0





j6=i ¢0(Bj) and (iv) for all b
0
i 2 Bi, b
0






i be a conjecture that puts probability "=#Bj on each behavior bj 2 Bj plus




j6=i¢0(Bj); and using that Bi is a …nite set, and that Ui(h1) varies continuously with




Lemma 4 is useful to prove Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.













Proof. Follows from a straightforward manipulation of the formula.
Lemma 5 tells us that any individual behavior bi such that individual i blocks the move to
xN (i.e. bi((x0xN;I) j h1) = 0) is never a best response whatever the conjecture ci and the




i is the same as bi except that individual i joins
the move to xN, is always a strictly better response.
Lemma 5 Take any bi 2 Bi with biN = 0. Take b
0
i 2 Bi such that b
0
ik = bik for k = 1;:::;N ¡ 1
and b
0
iN = 1. Then, Ui(h1)(b
0
i;ci;qi) > Ui(h1)(bi;ci;qi) for all ci 2
Q
j6=i ¢0(Bj) and all qi 2 Qi.
Proof. Consider any pro…le b¡i 2
Q
j6=i Bj. Let f(b¡i j h1) be the agreement set without
individual i, that is, all the moves after h1 on which the opponents of individual i agree when
their behavior is b¡i.
(i) For all b¡i 2
Q




(ii) For all b¡i 2
Q
j6=i Bj and qi 2 Qi, if (x0xN;I) 2 f(b¡i j h1) then










































i;ci;qi) > Ui(h1)(bi;ci;qi) for all ci 2
Q
j6=i¢0(Bj) and all qi 2 Qi.
We introduce some additional notations. Given bi 2 Bi, let Ki = #fk j bik = 1g · N; e(k)
is the individual behavior such that the kth component is 1 and the other components are 0,
and 1 is the unit vector, that is, the behavior where the individual agrees to join every move.
Lemma 6 establishes that there exists a conjecture ci and a belief qi such that any behavior
20bi 6= 1 where individual i agrees to move to xN is her unique best response. This conjecture is
such that it puts weight on bj = e(k) whenever bik = 1 and on bj = 1: The former part of the
conjecture guarantees that bi gives higher utility than b0
i 6= bi whenever b0
i blocks moves that are
not blocked by bi: The latter part, together with a suitably chosen prior-belief, implies that bi
outperforms any b0
i that agrees to strictly more moves than bi:
Lemma 6 Take any bi 2 Bi n f1g such that biN = 1. Then, for all b
0
i 2 Bi (b
0
i 6= bi), we have
Ui(h1)(bi;ci;qi) > Ui(h1)(b
0
i;ci;qi); where ci(h1) 2
Q







ui(xN) ¢ [Ki ¢ ui(xN) + ui(x1)]
¡1 if bj = e(k) and bik = 1
ui(x1) ¢ [Ki ¢ ui(xN) + ui(x1)]
¡1 if bj = 1
0 otherwise





" if k = N
"2 if bik = 1 and k 6= N
(1 ¡" ¡
P
(x0xk;I)jbik=1;k6=N "2) ¢[#f(x0xk;I) j bik = 0g]¡1 if bik = 0
with 0 < " · (ui(xN) ¡ui(xN¡1)) ¢ [N ¢ ui(xN¡1)]
¡1.
Proof. Let p(f(b¡i j h1)) be the probability the opponents of individual i agree on f(b¡i j h1).



















Ki ¢ ui(xN) + ui(x1)
if bik = 1,
and p(f(x0x0;;g) is the remainder. The probability p(f(x0xk;I)g) follows from the observation
that the agreement set is f(x0xk;I)g if and only if all opponents of i choose e(k) or 1; and not






















Two cases have to be considered. In Case 1 we consider b
0
i such that, for some k, bik = 1 and
b
0
ik = 0. In Case 2 we take b
0
i 6= bi such that bik = 1 implies b
0
ik = 1.
21Case 1. Since p(f(x0xk;I)g) = 0 if bik = 0, and there is k such that bik = 1 and b
0









































































ui(xk). Hence, Ui(h1)(bi;ci;qi) > Ui(h1)(b
0
i;ci;qi).






p(f(x0xk;I)g) ¢ ui(xk) +
·
ui(x1)














































































22Hence, by Lemma 4 it follows that Ui(h1)(bi;ci;qi) > Ui(h1)(b
0
i;ci;qi).
The next lemma shows that the behavior where i agrees to join every move is individually
rational.
Lemma 7 Take bi 2 Bi such that bik = 1, k = 1;:::;N. Then, for all b
0
i 2 Bi (b
0
i 6= bi) and for
all qi 2 Qi, we have Ui(h1)(bi;ci;qi) > Ui(h1)(b
0
i;ci;qi); where ci(h1) 2
Q






N if bj = e(k), k = 1;:::;N
0 otherwise
.


























i 6= bi, 8qi 2 Qi:
Putting these results together, we are able to show the following main result.
Theorem 8 Consider the social environment ¡¤: There is a unique behavior of individual i that
is socially rationalizable, P1
i = fe(N)g; i 2 I:
Proof. By De…nition 5, P0
i = Bi and P0 =
Q
i2I Bi. In the …rst iteration, by Lemma 5, all
bi 2 P0
i such that biN = 0 do not belong to P1
i , i 2 I. By Lemma 3, Lemma 6 and Lemma 7,
all bi such that biN = 1 belong to P1
i , i 2 I. So, P1
i = fbi j biN = 1g i 2 I:
In the second iteration, for all ci(h1) 2
Q
j6=i ¢0(P1
j ) and for all qi 2 Qi, the behavior bi such
that biN = 1 and bik = 0 if k 6= N gives to individual i a utility Ui(h1)(bi;ci;qi) = ui(xN). How-





i;ci;qi) < ui(xN) for all ci and all qi, because for some k < N;
b0
ik = 1; and the cautiousness of ci implies that with positive probability the opponents of i have
an agreement set f(x0xk;I)g; which leads to utility ui(xk) < ui(xN): So, P2
i = fe(N)g = P1
i ;
i 2 I:
The above result implies that social rationalizability satis…es the property of coalitional
rationality. When the outcomes can be Pareto ranked, a coalition selects the Pareto-dominant
outcome. Each individual only agrees to move to the Pareto dominating outcome, and blocks
all other moves.
Corollary 9 Consider the social environment ¡¤. We have Z1(x0) = fxNg.
235 Conclusion
Social environments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of agents
interact in a society. We have argued for the need of a new solution concept for social envi-
ronments that is based on individual rationality, called social rationalizability. One of the basic
steps in our construction is to model individual behavior in a social environment, which makes
a social environment apt to an analysis based on individual rationality. Individual behavior
within a coalition is modeled as the decision to agree to a coalitional move or to block it. Since
a coalition may have several moves available, and more than one coalition may have the option
to move at the same time, there can be many moves on which there is agreement. Individuals
therefore also form beliefs on which move in the set of moves on which there is agreement will
be carried out.
Social rationalizability identi…es which coalitions are likely to form and which outcomes
might occur when (1) the individuals are rational and endowed with a hierarchy of hypotheses,
and (2) this is common knowledge at the original status-quo. We have shown that for all social
environments the set of socially rationalizable outcomes is non-empty. The computation of the
set of socially rationalizable outcomes is greatly simpli…ed by using a reduction procedure, which
we show to be equivalent to the formal de…nition of social rationalizability.
Social rationalizability aims to be a weak concept that rules out with con…dence. Its non-
emptiness makes it applicable to cases where traditional solution concepts fail to make predic-
tions. It is also not too weak in the sense that it satis…es individual rationality. As a theory
of social behavior, social rationalizability should also be consistent with elementary notions of
coalitional rationality. For instance, when a coalition has to choose between a number of Pareto
ranked moves, it should select the Pareto dominating one for sure. It is shown that social
rationalizability is consistent with coalitional rationality.
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